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According to Epstein et al (2011), the unaccounted cost of coal – what economists call the externalities associated with mining, transporting and burning it – amount to something between 350 and 500 billion US dollars a year in the United States alone, a cost that would, if fully paid for, triple the cost of what is still the largest source of electrical supply in the contemporary world, way more than the cost of renewables. And yet coal provides more than 40 per cent of the world's electricity (Greenpeace 2008). SourceWatch (2015) list twenty-seven forms of pollution from coal, ranging from floods caused by mining activities to air pollution. This coal is ubiquitous in digital media, electronic media more generally, and the mechanical media that preceded them in the form of the energy required to make and run them, and in the form of plastics and other chemical products required to make them. It would be hard to imagine Epstein and his colleagues or SourceWatch being able to conduct the very large-scale research they do, or being able to communicate it to others today, without using those media. We are locked into coal, even in the era of peak oil, and perhaps even more so as a result of the fears of oil scarcity in the near future. In what follows I would like to present the materiality of coal as an integral part of the history and actuality of media, to suggest some ways that the coal industry and its offshoots prefigured the contemporary reign of finance capital, and to indicate how and why these stories, interesting enough in themselves, might give us a way to reconsider how we construct and conduct politics in the 21st century.

New King Coal
In the reign of Queen Elizabeth the First of England, priors of coastal Northumberland sent coal to London, where the Company of Brewers offered to fire their breweries in the vicinity of Westminster palace with wood because the Queen 'findeth hersealfe greately greved and annoyed with the taste and smoke of the see coles' (Galloway 1882: 24). Not so grieved as all that: within a decade, Good Queen Bess had acquired the landholding of key Tyneside collieries and become the beneficiary of the pollution she so assiduously avoided for herself. Not that anyone given the opportunity would not have avoided it. The 'sea-coals' of Newcastle, so called because the seams tumble out onto the North Sea coast, are rich in sulphur, and when burnt not only release carbon and particulates but large amounts of sulphur which, combining with water as sulphuric acid, produces acid rain, which ate away at the clothes and damaged the complexions of her subjects until the Clean Air Act of 1956 finally began to control the industrial as well as domestic use of coal for heating and energy. 

In those years, London acquired its nickname of 'The Smoke', and its reputation for pea-soup fogs, smog of such deadly thickness that as late as the 1950s the death toll from particularly dense aggregations mounted into the tens of thousands, as was the case in other coal-fired industrial cities like Pittsburgh, and is the case now in Beijing. As barbara Freese points out, coal's portability and its efficiency compared to wood, made it perfect for steam engines, which in turn made deep mining possible, draining water, operating lifts, and freighting the product to the industrial centres. Cheaper coal meant more railways which meant cheaper coal, in a vicious spiral. Steam-powered bulk shipping of the product of distant colonies fed the imperial factories, and transported the finished goods back to the colonial markets. If the Victorians ever spoke of the 'engine of growth', they would undoubtedly have imagined a steam engine powered by coal. 

It is not only that transport, which was traditionally included in the sociology and geography of communications well into the 1970s, mediates between distant places; or simply that coal-powered transport enabled a mass market in illustrated magazines and railway station bookstores, or housed vast arrays of advertising hoardings. It is not even that through transport, coal was communicated from its ancient underground home to faraway places, to be burned and redistributed in water and air in a new pattern. It is rather that coal began to make its way into the very fabric of media, from powering the printing presses to providing its colours. Industrial chemistry began, to the extent that such a statement can ever be more than a story indicating a broader social movement, with the 1856 invention of aniline dyes. The nineteen year old William Perkin, then following classes in chemistry at the Regents Street Polytechnic, was attempting to synthesise quinine when he accidentally produced a rich mauve dye. Unlike all previous dyes, which came from animals, vegetables of minerals, Perkin's mauve, the first chemically synthesised dye, derived from coal tar, the sticky, toxic residue of the coal gas used to fire street illumination and domestic lighting in the 19th century. Perkin made his fortune when the widow of Napoleon III determined to lighten her mourning garb and lit on the new dye as an appropriate step from all-consuming black to a seemly but more colourful afterlife. What the Empress wore today, all Europe wore tomorrow. Synthetic dyes and the fashion industry have a common origin. 

There is something magical about the emergence of synthetic colour from the black toxin of coal tar, as Michael Taussig (2006) has adumbrated. The rainbow of synthetic hues celebrated by modernist avant gardes in the early 20th century as much as the blaze and clash of colour in public space saturated with the new paints, printers' inks and dyes set the world alight (and ruined many industries based on the old natural dyes like indigo and madder). Coal's black splintered into as many hues as Newton's prism had extracted from the white light of the sun. At the same time, as and Esther Leslie (2005) is at pains to demonstrate, the anti-natural move to synthetic colour remained caught in a dialectical relationship with ideologies of nature like the Nazi's 'blood and soil', and linked the chemical industry that grew out of Perkin's mauve indissolubly with war, fro standardised colours of flags and uniforms to the art of camouflage, in an industry which, while based in colours, rapidly adapted to the manufacture of explosives, many of them used to blast more coal from the earth and to dynamite cuttings for railways to bring more coal to industry.  

In 2015, the price of oil plummeted, in part due to deliberate oversupply from Saudi Arabia, designed to make North American fracking and extraction of oil from bituminous shale, intended to achieve 'energy security', uneconomic and thus preserve its political power. Coal, which had increased its market share in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, also saw plummeting prices due to oversupply and dramatic falls in consumption due to the ongoing effects of the 2007 global financial crisis, especially in germany, in India and in China, which is also concerned to improve its air quality by cutting coal use, and has its own over-producing artisan (effectively unregulated or 'wildcat') coal mining sector. In the year of the Paris COP15 conference which achieved, against all the odds, some formal agreement on constraining climate change through management of fossil fuels, the tumbling price of oil and coal tended in exactly the opposite direction. Given that nine of the ten top companies in the Fortune 500 international listing are in the fossil fuels, automotive and energy businesses, and that spending on coal industry lobbyists was running at 18 million US dollars a year between 2008 and 2012 (OpenSecrets.org 2015: the energy sector as a whole spends 240 million a year in lobbying the US government), it seems likely that economic pressures will trump political sentiment. Given that the US Republican Party is the only major-nation conservative party to maintain its position of climate change denial (Båtstrand 2015) and likely to control the House if not the presidency after the next election, while the UK's conservative government, during the Paris talks, committed to hundreds of millions of pounds subsidy to diesel powered electricity generation (Stacey 2015) and support for the fracking industry, that political sentiment seems seems merely sentimental among governing elites. The coal industry, meanwhile, boasts that carbon sequestration can make coal-fired generators carbon neutral: as Tyfield (2014: 60) notes, to date, 'not a single full-size coal-fired power plant with CCS [Clean Coal System] is in operation' 

The magic of coal seems very different in this light. In part this may be due to a further aspect of coal, the culture of working class masculinity and militancy associated with coal throughout the 20th century. Colliers were the most exploited of workers on both sides of the Atlantic, and in the 19th and early 20th centuries fought back to establish unions based on the personal bonding that they needed to survive life down the pit. If, as Mitchell (2011) argues, the rise of oil to prominence was based on ousting miners' unions from their position of political and economic power, the closure of the last UK deep coal mine, also in 2015, indicates the end of a century-long struggle which reached its apogee in Mrs Thatcher's epic war against the miners in the mid-1980s. Coal, Mitchell argues (and in this is echoed by Barbara Freese, 2003) is tough to mine and tough to transport. It needs hauliers to move it from pithead to freight wagons, or to load it onto ships. At each point the human factor is likely to organise for its own interests rather than that of the owners. Grinding physical labour, hard-won solidarity, and a tradition of class struggle made the miners the last bastion of an admittedly masculinist and dirty but nonetheless profound political and cultural workplace, for lack of which the young men of ex-mining and manufacturing regions are increasingly disaffected and anti-social (Savage 2015). The rise of coal consumption and the demise of organised coal unions are intertwined. This is not the triumph of a new phase of capital overhauling the old industrial mode. We should not feel nostalgia for the dirt or the hard work, the lung diseases, the machismo. The bad new days are only the equal of the bad old days. In the increasingly rapid realisation of a long-delayed and deep-seated tendency in capital, this disaggregation of consumption from production is not contingent or marginal: the very energy and plastics that coal made and makes possible form the contemporary electronic media that enable the emergence of capital's intimate truth into the daylight. Financialisation is unthinkable without coal

Coal derivatives
 Carbon monoxide. Inimical to life. By-product of coal combustion, carbon monoxide is used throughout the chemical industry to produce acetic acid, aldehydes, methanol and phosgene, a precursor in plastics production. The disaggregated sulphur and trace metals, notably iron and mercury, are extracted for hundreds of product lines from solvents to lasing media in high-powered lasers, as used in long-distance fibre-optic backbones of the internet. Coal is even a major source of the hydrogen used in fuel cells. SourceWatch (2015) note, among heavy metals found in coal seams,  lead, mercury, nickel, tin, cadmium, antimony, and arsenic, uranium and isotopes of thorium and strontium, all of which are concentrated in the fly ash particulate matter released when the coal is burnt. Much of the ash is captured in scrubbing towers in larger power plants, and many of the metals are extracted, but much of the remaining sludge is uneconomic to cleanse and finds its way, through circuits of specialist recovery and cleansing plants, into landfill. The centuries-long history of coal-burning has left us a legacy of toxic metals as well as plastic waste, acid rain and methan emissions from which the planet struggles to recover. To the extent that the internet is a planetary phenomenon, any of our messages may be handled by coal-powered servers and routers, even if no coal is burnt locally. As the atmosphere is no respecter of borders, plumes of smoke can cross oceans. Where pollutants reach the water cycle, as in the case of sulphur dioxide from bituminous coal, the effects are global. The planet-spanning scale of telecommunications is matched by the by-products of the power used to run them and the plastics employed to protect them from the environment they have helped to produce.

At which point it is important to consider the kinds of traffic carried by the internet and telecommunications more generally. According to Cisco (2015), 'By 2016, global IP traffic will reach 1.1 zettabytes per year, or 88.4 exabytes (nearly one billion gigabytes) per month, and by 2019, global IP traffic will reach 2.0 zettabytes per year, or 168 exabytes per month'. While we might blame high-bandwidth consumer services like streaming video and online gaming for the massive increases, in 2013, one estimate had it that that only 38.5 per cent of internet traffic originated with humans: the rest was bots, among which cookie traffic from advertisers and automated trading bots from the world's finance markets formed a major slice, along with smaller numbers of surveillance bots from governmental sources (Neal 2013). In 2015, humans make up a larger proportion, just over half of web traffic, but in the context of overall skyrocketing growth in use, that only indicates that bot traffic is also growing, and fast (Zeifman 2015). Alongside business-to-consumer and business-to-business communications, including delivery of electronic consumer goods like videos and ebooks, the trade in futures and other derivatives is a real-time market which works on small margins and rapid changes in market conditions for particular commodities and bundles of commodities. This is the kind of live spot-market whose emergent-chaotic systems failure helped collapse the entire eastern seaboard power supply in Canada and the USA in 2003 and the May 2010 Flash Crash which wiped trillions of dollars off Wall Street in slightly over half an hour. Coal futures are part and parcel of this market, 40 per cent of whose energy needs it supplies.  

The volatility of derivatives markets and their centrality to the global financial crisis – whose eight-year duration bends the meaning of the word crisis beyond breaking point – are often held to mark a new era in capitalism, tied to the broad analysis of neo-liberalism, the economic dogma embraced by Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s and now the consensual faith of national governments and international economic and governance bodies worldwide. There is strong evidence, marshalled by David Harvey (2005, 2010), that neo-liberalism is not in fact an economic practice at all but a political one, aimed at ending the long struggle, from the fall of the European crowned heads in 1914 to the break-down of state socialism in the Soviet bloc in 1989, to create and maintain a welfare state and other basic rights for the working class. For Harvey and others, this marks the emergence of finance capital as the next stage of capital after the industrial era and the Fordist-Keynesian mid-twentieth-century age of consumerism. For others, including Maurizzio Lazzarato (2013), financialisation represents only the re-emergence of capital's true orientation, which is to produce money from money. Capital's goal is profit. Industrialisation provided one way to make an initial investment grow. Trapped by the falling rate of profit, Keynesianism provided a new way to ensure that  increase in consuption which would keep investment in the profit side of the ledger. Manufacture and consumption were merely means to secure the central goal, making more money out of money. 


Coal's role here is important historically as well as in its current role as engine of the internet. The native necessity of capital is growth. Marx explains this as being required by the falling rate of profit. As technologies develop, displacing workers, they enable produce increasing numbers of commodities, but at a unit cost which shrinks on the well-known principle of 'pile 'em high and sell 'em cheap'. Because the amount of profit on each sale diminishes, to secure growth capital needs to sell more units. To do so it has to produce more. But since in the process it has displaced the industrial workers whose wages used to pay for the commodities they produced, capital tends into crises of over-production. To solve this problem and secure the growth without which its crisis becomes terminal, capital offers loans so that the poor can afford to buy their products. But a loan is only a pledge to pay today with money borrowed against future wages, which the logic of technological improvement suggests is a bad bet: fewer people will have well-paid work in future, and less disposable income due to the privatisation of the old welfare system. An economy based on growing household debt, especially among those who can never hope to repay it, was a central cause of the mortgage bubble that instigated the 2007 crash, and is being rebuilt again as neo-liberal finance ministers globally use debt once again as a replacement for the missing growth that capital can no longer guarantee (Press Association 2015). The objective of speculators in the derivatives market, in the words of the Coal Trading Association (2010), 'is to make a profit from taking on the risk of price fluctuation that commercial users do not want'. Since future rates of profit cannot be known in advance, the risk associated with future prices can be sold on as a separate product,giving speculators a tranche of future profits, but also enabling them to sell on the risk. Speculation in debt repayment works in exactly the same way: to create profit today from the trade in repayments tomorrow, including the option to make a profit from a falling market price by selling on before the loss becomes apparent. Extracting value is the goal: the means may change, but the goal remains the same.

There are then both continuities and discontinuities in the new capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg (1951; first published in 1913) re-analysed the period of primitive accumulation that Marx had addressed in the formation of capital in the early modern period when common land was taken from the peasants, privatised and used to extract wealth. Luxemburg's insight was that this process continued in the equally brutal dispossession of colonised peoples in the age of the European empires. In our time this process continues with the privatisation of common goods and services, especially those created by workers' struggles for the welfare state, but also in the creative legislation that encourages the exploitation of mineral and fossil resources. Massive government subsidies for both extraction industries and financial services, paid for by selling off common goods like health, security and prison services, are ultimately paid by seizure of common assets, including the naturally occurring geology, water and air, and the permissions granted to capital to pollute these resources at no cost to itself, paid for again in the ill-health and impoverishment of the increasingly disenfranchised poor. Accumulation by  dispossession, to use Harvey's (2003) phrase, underwrites two other principles of contemporary capital, one of which was also already noted by Marx under the rubric of 'extended reproduction', by which he meant the investment of profits into growth rather than into meeting the needs of the present. In the industrial phase of capital, that made sense: the present in effect lent money to the future in return for the promise of growth. Today however the massive profits extracted by financial and other corporations are increasingly removed from the reinvestment cycle, precisely because the use of debt as surrogate for growth means that interest rates have been at zero for years, meaning that the return for investing in the future is now nil. Asa result huge amounts of money, estimated in the trillions of dollars, are sequestered in offshore financial havens, doing nothing, even as the world enters a third round of the current crisis with massive food shortages – associated with climate change – in Asia and Africa, and major wars raging across central and North Africa and the Middle east, again associated with climate change, drought and the brutal race to extract mineral wealth without benefit to the peasant natives of Congo, Angola and other war-torn nations. We have learned not to expect generosity from those who extract this wealth. It is quite possible that corporations, which benefit from the legal status of persons in intellectual property and contract law, have in fact sacrificed their right to be considered human in their rabid and suicidal race to accumulate wealth they do not intend to use at the expense of the commons and common decency. Privatisation is synonymous with privation. 

The commodity futures market now governs the coal industry. The trade in derivatives provides the coal industry, like other extraction industries, with the investment capital it needs to maintain growth. Since capital is absolved of consideration for the common good, that investment is premised on extracting more fossil fuel, and ensuring a market for it, rather than, for example, mitigating global warming. Futures prices, as measure of the likely market for coal, indicates the level of investment the market is prepared to put into the industry, thus effectovely over-riding any public policy moves by the momentum of the demand for profit. The fact that this profit is not only privatised but removed from the cycle of investment indicates something of the inhuman nature of this mode of capitalism. 

It also indicates a strange form of temporality through which capital extends its rule over history. Coal, in common with almost all our energy sources, is the product of sunlight. Millions of years ago, vast forests sank into swamps, were covered over, and in the dark, heat and pressure became rich seams of black carbon-rich rock. The coal we burn today is the gift of ancient sunlight. If there is debt involved, then we owe a debt to that ancestral forest. It is in this light that we can understand the otherwise baffling belief of Chip Beeker, a leading Alabama Republican debating Environmental Protection Agency proposed regulation of coal-fired power plants, that 'coal was created in Alabama by God, and the federal government should not enact policy that runs counter to God's plan'. While Twitter lit up with observations that God might have placed fossils in the ground so we could learn about evolution, few noted the true paradox of Beeker's faith: that coal beds (and oil fields) represent the most successful carbon sequestration project, without which Earth would have become uninhabitable long ago. If God had wanted us to burn coal, he wouldn't have buried it. And yet there is a grain of truth in Beeker's belief: coal is a gift from the universe, and should therefore be treated with respect. The immense number of chemicals already derived from coal indicate that we have scarcely begun tapping our chemical heritage; and that by burning it in vast quantities, we are destroying both the legacy of the past and the possibilities of the future. In turn, this indicates the temporal structure of capital lurking under the engines of perpetual technological and social change and the principle of growth, which would seem to make capital and the faith in progress an entirely future-oriented process. Instead, in every blazing lump of coal, we witness the sacrifice of both past and future to the present. Capital turns the obligations we owe to our ancestors and our offspring as natural human beings into debts owed by the past and the future to the present. The present, in this guise is a single point moving through time, a point which in itself remains unchanged. We might choose to see in this conception of time the diagram for the mechanical moving image of the analog era, while the flying scan of digital imaging would represent only its acceleration.

Carbon aesthetics
During the Massey conference on Working with Nature in April 2015, New Zealand eco-photographer Chris Orchard discussed Freud's narrative of the infant's forced separation from primary union with mother's body and world. That first trauma, Orchard suggested, is re-enacted in every photograph, ripping the instant from its home in the wholeness of flux. The trauma of the instant forcibly isolated from the flow of time is the tragedy of the still image. We might add that it is too the basis of its radical incompletion. The still photograph presents itself as if whole and entire, but is always divorced from how it became, and what it might become: it is purely actual, without potential, but in precisely that case it acquires a potential that the actual moment seized in the photo did not have: the chance to enter into dialogue with other, alien moments in time whenever someone looks at it. The moving image, we might continue, appears in the photographic laboratories of the last decade of the nineteenth century in order to heal both the trauma of separation and the radical new potentiality of the stilled image. This is the dialectic instigated by capital's seizure of the perpetual present as its site of accumulation: dependent on investment into futures to resolve the risks of the present, yet compulsively stripping profit from the future in order to accumulate now. This fundamentally unstable temporality is mirrored first in the still image, then in the attempt to replace each still with a successor in an endless movie; and finally in the ubiquitous imaging of 21st century digital media with their scans determining that even the individual frame can no longer pretend to wholeness. Multiplication and incompletion underpins capital as it underpins its image regimes. 

Coal's role in this is momentarily obscured by the manufacturing processes of the substrates of cinema. Nitrate film stock, the notorious early film capable of spontaneous combustion, was a close relative of nitroglycerin, the explosive. Its chemical antecedents include a number of chemicals derived from coal and coal gas. The colours and dyes applied throughout the colour era, from hand-painted strips in the first years of the twentieth century to Technicolor in mid-century and on to contemporary colour filters in digital projectors all derive from Perkin's initial discoveries. Coal-derived plastics coat and protect wiring and cabling, lamp and camera housings, lens coatings and internet routers, and provide many of the elements in new ceramic- and glass-based digital components. One of the most condensed forms of carbon, coal's complex chemistry derived from aeons of growth, decay and geological compaction is disassembled into its components and rewired into a global communications network of immense complexity, among whose most important roles is to provide the infrastructure for investment trades. 

Coal thus oscillates between two distinct modes of existence. On the one hand, it is a mineral with certain chemical qualities, which have made it historically a vital component in the building of the modern world, from railways to power generation and the formation of the chemical industry. At the same time is functions as a commodity, exchangeable for any other, equal to any other, and to that extent without any specific qualities at all save its price. We recognise that the first aspect, the use value of coal, is already multiple and temporal, and that there is no simple identity that can be ascribed to its multiple relocations and uses. Perversely the exchange value of coal does ascribe such an identity, attempting to anchor coal to its present – for example by pricing up reserves in hand – and ignoring both its use and abuse. External to both accounts are the immense costs of mining, burning and chemical manipulations of coal, but perhaps most of all the claim of coal itself to a stake in its own uses and exchange. 

It would be absurd to suggest that coal mines, coal deposits, slag heaps and soot should have a stake in public life; that they should vote or address assemblies. Yet we have already welcomed one non-human agent into the political life of nations, and given it immense authority in rule, to the extent that we say to one another that we have no alternative but to obey the dictates of the Market, that immense network  of computers into which we plug interchangeable bank employees, from clerks to CEOs. The Market cyborg rules. This explains the pursuit of profit even to the point at which it risks the survival of the human race. But if we have given the Market such an immense say in our human affairs, why can we not give an equal, and greater voice, to the non-human environment? One answer is Wittgenstein's (2009: 120): 'If a lion could speak, we could not understand him'. The fact is however that lion's – and climatic systems, glaciers, forests, polar bears and cockroaches – can and do speak, but that we have no desire to listen when they warn us of what is happening to them and to us.  

The problem then is one of communication. We have surrendered the greater part of our communications media to advertising and trade. Very little of a communications common is left, and much of that is taken up, understandably if disturbingly, by political and religious factions driven by desperation and exclusion, and by the cries for help of the isolated and stressed created by the destruction of the common good. Inventing new means of communication with the natural world will seem to these as a trivial pursuit compared to the immediate danger of their own concerns. Yet that is precisely why communication is the central platform of a new politics. Since public administration has failed,alongside capitalist economies, we must work on the infrastructure on which both depend, the media. Communication is the goal but also the means of a new, open polity, one ion which coal will take its place not as exploited reserve but as active participant. It is in our gift, a gift which derives from the debt we owe both past and future, to honour and recognise the minerality in the materiality of media, and in that recognition to allow coal and the other materials to speak their part, to make the materiality of media the basis for an environmental and communicative politics for the 21st century.
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